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OLL 85-3178 11 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 11 September 1985 Briefing on the Soviet Anti-Satellite System

1. On 11 September 1985, in Room S-407 The Capitol, at 1500 hours, the following Senators and staff members were briefed on the Soviet Anti-Satellite System:

SENATORS

John Glenn (D., OH) - Armed Services
Dennis DeConcini (D., AZ) - Appropriations
Orrin G. Hatch (R., UT) - SSCI
Dale Bumpers (D., ARK) - Appropriations
John Kerry (D., MA) - Foreign Relations
Chic Hecht (R., NV) - SSCI
Malcolm Wallop (R., WY) - Arms Control Negotiation Ob.
Daniel Evans (D., WA) - Foreign Relations
Ted Stevens (R., AK) - Appropriations (Chmn Defense)
Dan Quayle (R., IND) - Armed Services
William Cohen (R., ME) - Armed Services
John Warner (R., VA) - Armed Services
J. James Exon (D., NEB) - Armed Services

STAFF MEMBERS

Bill Hoehn, Senate Armed Services
Len Weiss, Governmental Affairs (Staff Minority
Director, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation, & Gov't Processes)
John Despres, SSCI

CIA

OSWR/DI

OIA/DI
OLL/DCI
ongressional Fellow

All Portions SECRET

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25 X 1	2. The meeting was at Senator Glenn's request and orchestrated by (Congressional Fellow). Senator Glenn had taken the liberty to invite Members of the Armed Services, Appropriations, Intelligence Select and Foreign Relations Committees. Apparently many Senators had not received a previous briefing or wanted a refresher on the In light of a pending Senator Kerry bill proposing a moratorium on the development of a U.S. ASAT system, the session was time critical.	25 X 1
25X1 25X1	initiated the briefing with an introduction to the Soviet militarization of space, placing emphasis on the fact that the ASAT is only one manifestation of their total effort. combined technical and tutorial discussion of the Soviet ASAT	ີ 25X1
25X1 25X1	4. The entire session was extremely interactive. Senator Glenn took the lead in asking questions on areas that were beneficial to his less knowledgeable colleagues. Most of his questions focused on Senator Kerry was not basnrul in fielding questions. He did not seem interested in our assessment of the Soviet potential, but rather focused his attention on their demonstrated capabilities. At one point Senator Kerry fielded a philosophical question	25X1 25X1 25X1
25 X 1	At this point it seemed to be Kerry vs. the remaining Senators. Senator Glenn put a stop to this philosophical trend by stating that this topic was not appropriate for the intent of this briefing. Senator Glenn seemed somewhat perplexed with Senator Kerry when he subsequently raised this same issue. However, he again tactfully handled the situation.	
25X1	5. Once the Soviet capabilities were covered in extensive detail, the Senators' major interest shifted to the U.S. system. At this point made it very clear that his responses were his opinion only and not to be construed as a CIA net technical assessment. The major concern focused on which system was superior. From a technological standpoint, the U.S. system would be preferred.	25X1
25 X 1		

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